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## The Rise and Fall of the Self: An Architectural History (1996)

Translated from the Dutch by Wanda Boeke

In this article I intend to focus on the parallel historical emergence, conceptualization, virtualization, and evaporation of both Self as a psycho-historical category and Space as an architectural formula. I shall concentrate on some specific historical periods that may demonstrate the intricate connections be-tween the development of introspective insights on the one hand and the notion of space as an autonomous architectural concept on the other. Starting with the 18th-century earliest explorations of the parallax effect, passing through the Modernist declaration of space as a positive value, and ending up with the hyperspace of VR, Smart-building, and digital networks produced by current computer technology, an architectural history can be considered as a full circle of consciousness of Self that took about 250 years.

Misunderstandings regarding the meaning of concepts employed are always lurking when such a broad approach is used. That is why I will start off by giving the definitions that will be applied to "Space" and "Self" here. Space means architectural space, the region that is the content and the product of design activity. Self is, in conformity with the definition of Jean-Pierre Vernant, "constituted by the practices and stances which confer upon the subject a dimension of 'interiority' and constitute him as a singular individual whose authentic nature resides wholly in his inner life." In my own words: the Self is a collective term constituted by notions of subjects within which self-conscious-ness is supposed.

The concept of "interiority" immediately implies my most important assertion: in order to reflect an inner world, a new dimension in which to think was necessary. This human activity, historically of a relatively recent date, has made us conscious of space as an independent, autonomous phenomenon. If there is to be an "interior" then also an "exterior." If there is a private world, then also a public world. If there is an I, then also a space in which to manifest that I. Interiority is a spatial, an architectonic idea; interiority has called that idea to life. But it might also be that the discovery of Space, conversely, has helped in discovering Self. It is this relationship that I wish to investigate, in all its historical dynamics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In other words, the question which forms the basis of this book: What forms of Subject are possible outside the individualist (Tocqueville) Self, and how does such a single but externalized and interacting Subject relate to various existing or potential collective Subjects? --can be answered with: Every form of subjectivity that understands this question at all. For, it is the fate of this individualistic Self to think itself, but not consequently this thinking again. Once this stage has been reached, then the subject is open to any imaginable direction.

It is customary in current architectural theory that "the subject" appears in order to provide certain architectonic concepts with a weighty philosophical argument. In the past 15 years, particularly in US academic discourse, the tendency to inject the architectural debate with a dose of subject-oriented philosophy has been very evident.

However, it is not customary to make this assumed relationship the point of departure for a history of the subject, to write an architectural history that would lend insight into the psychological manifestation, if not the social expression, of the notion of subject. But should that happen, a breathtaking relationship between the history of mind, psychohistory and architecture would be brought to light; in particular, of architectonic space as a stage for human behaviour. It could, for instance, become clear in how far the historical collapse of concepts like "integrated personality" and "autonomous individual," so much the order of the day in formulating postmodern theory over the past 20 years, finds obvious repercussions in contemporary architecture: not only in the form of spectacular projects authored by a few architects, with a grand feeling of space, but in fact in the dismantling of architecture as a framework for our daily life and as a scenery for our behaviour.

I wish to present a scenario of how such a history might look. It is intended as a strong recommendation to investigate this more extensively in the future.

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The concepts of Self and Space appear to be equally popular these past years: I would even hazard to say absolutely equal in popularity. For, there exists a hidden symbiosis between these two concepts that is historically deeply rooted. This relationship, as well, has received a lot of attention. It explains and illustrates social relations, usually out of sociological or phenomenological motives; or the status of the body in space and the experiences that this generates are gone into. Seldom, however, is architectonic space, the space that is produced as such by building, explicitly the order of the day. For that matter, I am convinced that the architectural debate is letting a great opportunity pass it by. It continually amazes me how little the architectural community, even at the highest level of architectural theory, knows of the debates being carried on within psychology, philosophy, and anthropology concerning space. And when these debates do come to the fore, then it is amazing to see how a very select number of authors keeps serving as inspiration over and over again, and how slowly and arbitrarily this little group mutates or is appended to.

The reverse is not very different. Seldom, in the previously mentioned debates of the subject and Self, is architectonic space per se explored. Exactly where a discourse

could be concrete by referring to the speciality of space itself, architecture, an indispensable source, is not tapped. Along with this, a unique opportunity for writing an integral history is lost. This missed opportunity is all the more amazing since the power of integration has been advocated in the various humanities and social sciences for years, conscious as these parties are of their vulnerability should they keep sticking to positivistic, detail-oriented investigation on the one hand and top-heavy scientific theory on the other. It makes one suspect a deeper reason for this blindness, whereby the literal and figurative container-concept "space" has remained weak as an integrating factor in the writing of history, while as a philosophical concept it has all but been declared to be the major topic of the day.

What are the causes of this "blindness?" Where current historical writing in all its variation struggles to evaluate problematic sources such as diaries, police ordinances, government re-ports, books of folklore, paintings, grotesques, and whatever else they might be, space as a source also entails many complications that make a simple assessment impossible. In addition, space is not only a source to be utilized, but also an epistemological notion, and in fact it is a dimension of culture as well; through the recent widening of both the discipline of history and the concept of culture, this has entered the visual field. Self-reflection on the historian's part is therefore indispensable. This brings me to a second factor of this blindness: I believe that the investigation of Space and Self possesses added relevance for the theory of history, since both are directly involved in notions such as power of opinion and free will, notions that have been strongly relativized in contemporary historical writing, but that at the same time cannot be discarded. After all, Self refers to a separate position in the world and a conscious-ness of this. Space is a field where the actualizing of Self occurs or is frustrated. Both refer to a voluntaristic interpretation of the world as arena.<sup>2</sup> The point is to indicate the exact moments at which Self as a spatial problem and space as a subjective problem clearly enter onto the stage.

Beside this there is also a very specific reason to employ space as an investigative dimension (and as an object of investigation) and bring with it the concept of Self from developmental psychology. Whether it is the positive description of space or the negative assessment of emptiness, the idea of free will plays a crucial role for both the producers of space as well as those who make use of it. Space is usually interpreted symbolically as stage, as decor, as play area, as theatre, as straitjacket, and whatnot. The realm of thought stretches from a utopian vision of spatial surroundings as a theatre for demiurgic interventions, to an apocalyptic nightmare about anonymous, anthropomorphic but faceless, apparati in an otherwise empty universe. Space is always a microcosm in which cultural dominations and latent desires wage an

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Architectonic space is both actually and metaphorically always space for action. Although space can simply be used as just another source in an ever expanding cultural history, it can also turn this very expansion into the subject of discussion. Due to the fact that the acting individual of free (and good) will is losing more and more ground to the determinisms that constitute him/her, space is the ideal historical aspect to clear up this dilemma. In innumerable architectonic and urban design proposals, freedom of action is assumed, while the people who are supposed to actualize these proposals have ended up in an ever tighter theoretical as well as actual straitjacket, which simultaneously serves as an alibi for every abdication. Architectonic space is the theater of this drama. It can provide the writing of history with an impulse that it needs in its overweening subjectivism.

invisible power game. In the history of space, voluntarists and determinists wage a perpetual war, wherein free will is worshipped especially by the makers of space. By now employing this term, this dimension, in investigating the history of mind, the formulated problem can gain a more than theoretical charge. It can indicate in how far the crisis of free will, the belief in the development of the individual, is a true life-experience instead of a philosophical fight behind the scenes.<sup>3</sup>

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Those who wish to use space, particularly the architectonic parameters of interior and exterior space, as a source for cultural history will have to take into account certain decisive caesuras in architectural history, understood here as a cultural history approached from the point of view of building. These caesuras are, as it happens, not only important from the point of view of stylistic changes or new building specifications, but also particularly in view of the periodization of the history of space as epistemological notion. To limit ourselves to the modern history of Western Europe, it is from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance to the Baroque and the Rococo, one of ingenious manipulations of space. Initially only in church buildings, later also in palatial, municipal, and landscape ensembles there was an increasingly frequent concentration on staging that had consequences for spatial design and the experience of it. However, this does not imply a conscious use of the spatial element, let alone in the ocean of modest, uncomplicated, and unpretentious building industry on the part of do-it-yourselfers and unlicensed craftspeople. It was the objects, the ornaments, and their limits that formed a reflection of religious values. That occasionally (and we have to guard against anachronisms here) spatial consequences might have been appreciated as a secondary effect does not detract from this. Whether they were richly worked pulpits, stained-glass windows or stylized park promenades consisting of greenery, paths, and fountains, the objects were the literal substance of architecture and simultaneously the expression of unquestioned identities (which at that time of course could never have been referred to in that way). Space was exclusively and only a side effect, of which the architects as well as the lay folk of that time still did not have a conceptual notion.

During the course of the 18th century a change appears, due to a number of long-range factors:

1) Demographic growth and increased urbanization led to an enormous enlargement of the scale of society as a whole. Because of this it became increasingly important to organize and plan spatially. Moreover, "expansion" became an extremely important category of (capitalistic) thinking, with obvious implications for space. Space itself

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The struggle between voluntarism and determinism in contemporary architecture, considered as a component of visual culture, is extensively treated in Bouman and Toorn. This book brings to the fore how the work of a series of "ingenious" and charismatic architects can be understood as the raw material for a matrix to map out contemporary culture.

became increasingly "smaller" and scarcer.<sup>4</sup> Think at this point, for instance, also of the consequences of the British Enclosures Movement in the second half of the 18th century.<sup>5</sup>

- 2) The social changes that were carried out during the revolutionary period from 1776 to 1848 produced new leading groups and an accompanying shift in attitude within those groups. The architects' new clientele had their own wishes for new functions. Old assignments like palaces, country mansions, gardens, church-es, lost ground to designs for apartments, factories, and exhibit halls. It all had to be bigger and more massive in scale and size, more economical and lie within the scope of the moral and aesthetic demands of the bourgeoisie.<sup>6</sup>
- 3) Individualizing, privatizing, rationalizing all led to an increasing secularization whereby not only God lost meaning as a directive for a growing number of people, but every sacred absolute disappeared as well; nothing retained its moralizing and unifying force anymore. Thus in the end, the sacred was socio-logically proscribed. Space, too, was desacralized and seen as a pragmatic realm, a zoning envelope, accessible to any function whatsoever. Moreover, as soon as gods and demons had given up their positions, it could be reorganized according to personal insight.
- 4) Another factor of change, which would be hard to overestimate, concerns technology. The use of steel, glass, and rein-forced concrete took off starting in the 19th century. Larger spans were now possible, steel and concrete skeletons appeared, freeing facades from thick, supporting walls and enabling the use of glass on a large scale as facing. Not only did space become unconfined and more flowing, but new experiments became possible with the parallax and spatial blending which had not been either conceptually or technically possible in traditional building. Beside these technical innovations in construction, we can also speak in more general terms about the influence of technology on spatial awareness: distance is being bridged faster and faster, to the point where telemetry has accelerated the transmission of information to the speed of light.
- 5) Time and space were institutionalized as abstractions, culminating in World Standard Time and relative space.<sup>7</sup> Through the localization, or rather the invention, of the form-content anti-thesis and the popularity of introspection, all corners of the psyche turned out to contain unexpected categories for which names had to be found.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Space as "commodity," as economic goods, has been investigated in particular by Marxist historians, see Lefebvre and Cas-tells.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Particularly in England there was, after the civil war, nothing to keep the land-owners from carrying out a capitalist rationalization of farming. This had far-reaching consequences in the long run for urban development in Europe. Fencing, partitioning, and enclosure contributed not only to the awareness of mine and thine, but in my view also to the development of the "private consciousness," of the leftover "public domain," and finally, even more fundamentally, to the idea of space as markable substance. Moreover, this rationalization also led to the notion of "distance" being commercialized with an eye to investigating the cheapest possibilities for bridging it. In so-doing, the notion of "time" changed as well.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Posener claims that the pluriformity of style and the bad taste of the 19th century was primarily the result of the triumph of the bourgeoisie, in the age of stiff competition. The new monopolistic capitalism that was to establish itself at the end of the 19th century favored the development of its own architectural language, which would be called the Modern Movement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Kern has exhaustively described the developments of the notions of time and space between 1880 and the First World War. Most striking is the incongruence that arose between the objectification and institutionalization of space and time on the one hand, and the shattering of the collective experience into an aggregate of private times and spatial sensations on the other.

This all-encompassing rampant growth of language applied also to space. It could be understood only when, as a linguistic term, it was liberated from all spiritual or material particularization and became a general concept. Consequently, it kept drawing attention to itself by presenting difficulties every time people tried to attach this generality to a particularization again.

- 6) Furthermore, we may not forget the parallel developments in the arts and sciences. Beginning with the result of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes (Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns)<sup>8</sup> there was plenty of room for a subjectivist approach. In the visual arts well-known techniques, such as embossing, coulisses, light-and-shadow play, treatment of landscapes and skyscapes, perspectives, etc., were being utilized simultaneously in unprecedented ways. Finally, in the 20th century homogenous space, in cubism, constructivism, and surrealism, was caught out and shattered. In physics, description of homogenous, isotropic space was revolutionized in a different way. Anthropology researched the cultural relativities of space, psychology started applying itself to the psychosensorial, psychomotoric, and cognitive aspects of spatial perception.
- 7) Besides these contextual impulses favouring the awareness of space, there are also the immanent developments in spatial dis-course. Before space could be thought of as an independent (artistic) phenomenon, aesthetics as a discipline had to come into being. From Vico to Baumgarten and Hegel, we see a gradual anatomizing of the artistically beautiful into a separate thinkable category. This offered a philosophical basis for an architectural theory in which space could be investigated as "essence."
- 8) To summarize, we can equate the previously mentioned social causes with the end of self-evidences. The social order, mercantilistic regulation, absolute leadership of rulers by the grace of God, faith, culture, language --everything lost its obvious-ness and consequently became further anatomized in the well-meaning social sciences. So, too, space: it suddenly started becoming noticeable. From that moment on, every designer tried to build a bridge to the unconscious, to self-evidence, but no one can really go back any more.

With this we arrive at the point that I touched upon in my initial hypothesis, that the discovery of Space was a result of the need to develop a metaphor for the inner world of Self. One of the most radical results of these social changes was privatization in many areas. The triumphant bourgeois culture favoured the development of homo clausus, whose head became a hatchery for hyperindividual idiosyncrasies (see both the Elias titles). For the development of the concept of space, privatization meant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In architecture, too, this debate was pursued, particularly by Claude Perrault, the king's master builder. Here as well the issue was whether to adhere strictly to the classic canon (the colonnades and the principles of proportion) or whether to indulge in freer application (for Perrault the important thing was the freedom to be even more strict, whereby savings could be achieved through standardization). When the conflict was finally decided in favor of the Moderns, subjectivism could enter the scene, whereby individual experience became the measure, and the new parallactic experiments with colonnades could begin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In this instance the issue is the prevalent phenomenon of the desire to investigate and exorcise an epistemological crisis, which in turn leads to a deepening of the crisis. "Important aspects of basic social processes are not available for rational examination; and indeed, if they were, if individuals could respond to them in an instrumental fashion, society could not be held together" (Weinstein and Platt 17).

more attention was paid to the "upholstering" of interior space where the individual was lord and master (see Muller), while the anatomizing and rationalizing of exterior space relegated it to a leftover between buildings where transportation began to predominate.

It is within this historical pattern of development that we can distinguish caesuras. During the course of the 18th century, architects and artists began realizing space without developing a vocabulary for it at the time. We encounter an interest in space only infrequently in writing and have to deduce it mostly from a new aesthetics. This could have led to experiencing the same environment in a different way but we can verify a new playing with space particularly in the practice of building itself. Architecture since approximately 1730 was characterized more and more by the use of new methods to achieve parallax-effects. At that time no actual tectonic innovation was available: new materials such as steel and reinforced concrete had not yet been sufficiently developed, so that architecture remained a more or less richly ornamented box (cf. Collins 26). However, illusionary effects were in fact achieved, particularly through the use of mirrors. By means of reflection, space could be extended infinitely and old spatial limitations overcome. It was this predilection for spatial manipulation in architecture (naturally by the very rich) that distinctly marks the architectural history of the 18th century. In garden architecture as well we see this emerging predilection for spatial effects. It was particularly in the ordered chaos of the English garden that designers sought to guide experience itself. To this end, space was one of their interests (cf. Collins 285). Other works that should be mentioned here are Piranesi's etchings, the phantasmagoric designs of Boullee, and Soufflot's parallax experiments in, for instance, the Parisian Sainte-Genevieve (the present-day Pantheon).<sup>10</sup> These can be seen as willful manipulations of spatial features.

Yet here as well, the material object, which still bore a more or less religious charge, continued to be the focus of the design's discipline. And so it remained over the entire course of the 19th century. Although, despite the separation of "industrial" and "fine" arts (the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole des Beaux-Arts), the scope of architecture became larger and had new specifications that led to new structural forms and types, the essence continued to be sought in ornament and construction. The fact remains that the word "space" wasn't used much more often in the 19th century than before, and that before the term would catch on real innovations had to come about in the parallactic effects, thus in actual new spaces, without tricks such as mirrors. We might think here of, for example, the Ste. Genevieve (1843) and Nationale (1868) libraries by Henri Labrouste, Sir Joseph Paxton's Crystal Palace (1851) and Gottfried Semper's Royal Prussian Theatre in Dresden (1838). But once this did come into use, the whole architectural theory debate exploded.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Where for Piranesi the notion of space was still important to reach a new staging, Boullee was already working on pointed parallax experiments, with double, triple, and irregular colon-nades. This was all still being worked out in a flat plane, however (both left only a modest number of constructed works). Soufflot experimented with real space in his Sainte Genevieve (1757). Here he tried to achieve a similar effect to the one he had experienced in the Notre Dame, where "the spectator, as he advances and as he moves away, distinguishes in the distance a thousand objects, at one moment found, at another lost again, offering him delightful spectacles" (quoted in Collins 28). As you move through the space of the Pantheon, groups of columns appear to be moving along with you.

At the end of the 19th century the concept of Space, by now secularized to a neutral, factual emptiness, was thought of for the first time in architectural theory and soon after in the practice of building as well. From then on, space became a positive, objectified, directly utilizable element in design and, again not long after, in the lay appreciation of architecture. Having already been aware of space for about two centuries, people now conceived of it, without the mediation of the object or metaphysics, as a factual, independent unity. No longer was it merely a result posteriori, but a generally accepted point of departure, an a priori of design. From this point on, the object could be seen simply as a mould for the true architectonic essence.

However, the issue of space extended much further. Without falling back into historicistic stereotypes, it can be stated that around 1900 space received attention on all fronts at the same time. In physics, psychology, aesthetics, politics, building -- everywhere new spatial understanding was being developed, or at any rate people tried to come to an understanding of the newly perceived mental category (see the intriguing overview by Kern). "Obviously the vitality of the concept of space overruled the faculties dividing human occupations," says van de Ven (220), struck by how the same concept was being developed in different countries and by different persons independent of one another. Despite the fact that concepts of space tended to be popular rather than "vital" in van de Ven's sense, an unceasing stream of publications and experiments begins in the last quarter of the 19th century.

An example of the new interest in conceptual thought regarding space was Henri Bergson, a philosopher and a great inspiration to architects and artists of the early 20th century. Bergson writes in his Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience and l'Evolution Creatrice about the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea (Creative 335). For ages people couldn't figure them out due to a categorical confusion between movement and distance, and between time and space. In the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, time, the durée or duration, is measured in spatial unities. Hereby movement is wrongfully characterized, according to Berg-son, by a sequence of contingent moments of being that are fundamentally alien to movement itself. In this

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This awareness of space was not necessarily always a positive experience at all. At the same point in time the neurological disorder agoraphobia appeared. Raumscheu is a German term deriving from (perceptual) psychology of the late 19th century. It is also known as Platzschwindel or agoraphobia --see Benedikt, also Westphal. A first clinical description without further mention we find, though, as early as the 1830s. In the meantime there was plenty of readily available literature about the social backgrounds of the onset of agoraphobia. We now know that it concerns a social anxiety projected onto physical space --see Swaan, particularly "Uitgaansangst en uitgaansbeperking; over de verschuiving van bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishoud-ing" [Fear and Curtailing of Sociability: About the Shift from a Peremptory Economy to an Economy of Negotiation], 81-115.

Although in psychology there is no direct connection made with architecture or urban development, much of this terminology turned out to be very useful for architectural criticism. Writ-ers like Alois Riegl, Heinrich Wolfflin, and Wilhelm Worringer investigated the stress that emptiness can generate and argued for tactile proximity, volume, and substance as an identity-ori-ented answer to nothingness --see Riegl. During the Modern era agoraphobia slipped into oblivion. There was a resurgence, however, in both sociological criticism as well as in architec-tural esthetics from the 1960s onward --see, e.g., Mitscherlich.

way you can divide up the distance to infinity without reaching the core, the flowing movement itself. By distinguishing the categories so sharply, the paradox was now unravelled as an error in reasoning.

Architecture underwent a similar breakthrough in perceived notions. Even though, as has been mentioned, from the 18th century onward people were able to think of space as a manipulatable phenomenon, they continued to stick to the historical styles that were still enveloping it like a box. Raumdurchdringung, as it came to be called after a time, was and remained unknown. It was not until in the 1890s, first in the German Empire and Austria, that movement was discovered as the measure of space. Building on Hegel's aesthetics and Semper's architectural theory (see in particular Semper XXIV-XXXIV, where he considers "direction" as an essential element in architecture), a large number of artists and theoreticians set to work to formulate the budding notion of space. Movement was hereby the decisive criteria for experiencing space. Initially this concerned only the eyes that would "feel out" space<sup>12</sup>; later the entire body followed.<sup>13</sup> In this way the human once again became the measure of all things.<sup>14</sup> As long as people continued to reproduce age-old typologies in the neo-styles of the 19th century, there could be from such an experience of movement no question of interpenetrating spaces; they didn't get beyond the appreciation of objects having a more or less agreed-upon beauty. But when emptiness itself came under scrutiny, the issue was no more rules but the subjective experience of flowing space. In spite of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> It was the sculptor von Hildebrand's idea not to look at material things as reality, but also the space in which those things have their place[.xxx]. With this his concept of reality enlarged to an invisible unity that held everything together. "The Arrangement of the object occurs in hindsight in order to make the space in which it lives perceptible" --von Hildebrand, Gesammelte 27. Although this abstraction of the invisible medium of things, space, was in itself a considerable achievement, the distinction between Gesichtsvorstellung, pano-ramic perception, and Bewegungsvorstellung, mobile perception, conferred on Hildebrand's thought a lasting value in the theory of architecture (see ibidem 204-11). The point here was the fact that within a certain distance from an object the eyes can no longer capture that object in its entirety in a Fernbild, a long shot, but are forced, through tiny movements to construct an object mentally and identify it: "But, should the viewer step closer, so that he needs a different positioning and adjustment of the eyes in order to accommodate the given object, he no longer maintains the entirety in a single glance and he can put the image together only by lateral movement of the eyes with various adjustments" (205). One could say that by means of this feeling out, a kind of spatial tactility is being addressed which withdraws things from the flat, visual panorama and exceptionalizes them. We are referring in this case to Bewegungsvorstel-lung, the [perception.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Somewhat later in the year in which Hildebrand published his essay about the problem of form (see note 12), August Schmarsow held his inaugural address as full professor in art history at the University of Leipzig. In this speech he went deeper than Hildebrand into the fundamental value of the concept of space for architecture, and described it as Raumgestalterin, a shaper of space --Schmarsow, Raumgestaltung 11. From a Hegelian perspective he defined space in consequent publications as the etat d'ame, the condition of soul, of architecture. The degree to which this soul was reached depended on the degree of Raumgefuhl, sense of space. Later, in Der Wert and Grundbegriffe, he formulated a theory, in the company of well-known scientific practitioners such as Alois Riegl and Heinrich Wolfflin, where it was not so much the movement of the pupil that was the criteria of spatial perception, as it was the movement of the entire body, through which movement through space could be actualized. <sup>14</sup> This slogan of the sophist Protagoras must not be seen in a pejorative sense. It "only" directs us to a large-scale movement in late 19th-century culture, a basic subjectivism, that definitively pushed aside metaphysical universals on all fronts, prior to the era of Nietzsche but after the discussion had been opened with the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. It would be get-ting too far off the subject to go into this operation deeply. It should be said, however, that it is very significant for an appreciation of the problem of Self. After all, with the conclusion that individuals must found and give meaning to their thinking, derived from their own egocentric explanation taking into account psychic and social factors, with the advent also of pragmatism and subjectivism, Self is no longer an (unconscious) variable, but a substance to be taken in hand. It is at that moment also up to the individuals to muster the strength them-selves. Names that are linked to this epistemological movement toward a new nominalism are. of course, Darwin, Freud, Saussure, William James and Husserl, Mach, Mauthner, Ortega y Gasset, Jaffe, Planck, Popper, and Eccles.

theoreticians' efforts to think up a new terminology, they could not get movement under linguistic control. Investigating space means focusing on what is not agreed upon and what is not to be agreed upon.

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And then came Modernism. It is pre-eminently the Modern Movement that made space an end in and of itself. Space was the most lauded characteristic of this architecture: free space where light, air, and sun could pour in without restraint, where interior and exterior flowed into each other, where the function, the life inside the building was to be seen from the outside, where democracy, the free competition of citizens and of their opinions, had found its ideal stage.

But where these characteristics of Modern Space concerned the Self, the program turned out not to work. Although light and air came inside in generous quantities, the democratic spectrum developed not as competing identities but as adolescent roleconfusion in the strictest sense of the term. Modern architectonic space was at best symbolic of space that entered the mind when monolithic ideals crumbled away in ideologies that successively foundered, in dispersed ideas and faits divers. And this mind belonged to one suffering from a dearth of experience.<sup>15</sup> In short, there was indeed space, but no mature Self to make use of it; there was indeed freedom of speech and freedom of action, but no freedom to formulate a plausible opinion positively; there was a lot of space for provisional policy, but there was little value that could last. This discrepancy between an excess of anonymous, neutral, wellintentioned distemic space and the lack of its ideational and imaginative use has, in my view, contributed enormously to the spreading all-pervasive criticism of this architecture from 1960 onward. It is also this line of criticism that has led to the uncoupling of space and emancipatory rhetoric. Space was no more necessarily the domain of Progress but became a domain for the here and now.

With this we come to the last crucial step in the history of space: the advent of cyberspace, the space that no longer needs the physical carrier of architecture or evinces little interest in it. I am referring to the virtual space of networks, to virtual

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Poverty of experience was introduced as a concept in 1931 by Walter Benjamin in his important essay "Erfahrung und Armut" ("Experience and Poverty"). In this essay and in "The Destructive Character," Benjamin formulates a constructive criticism of modern building which he sees as the necessary outcome of a lost historical awareness of time in which experience had its place.: "The poverty of experience: this must not be understood as if people yearn for new experience. No, they yearn for an Umwelt, an environment, in which they can validate their poverty, their external and ultimately also their interior dearth, so that something respectable can come out of it." ("Erfahrung" 218, tr. OB) Benjamin sees the modern transparent glass architecture as precisely the appropriate reflection of the time in which it is difficult to "leave traces behind" (217). It is precisely this cynical expression of praise on behalf of modern building that characterizes the essence of the dissatisfaction after the Second World War, no doubt strengthened by the all too opportunistic interpretation that was endowed it by the postwar reconstruction politicians and project developers.

reality, and to the intelligent environment based on smart-tech. This is the world of the new media. If we are going to spend more and more time in cyberspace, the question will arise to what extent the physical environment still matters. Is architecture still architecture once it has been transplanted to Amplified Intelligence? Is an abstract, plug-in box --the mini-mum architectural requirement for being online and "e-mailable" --still architecture? As soon as our communications become part of a virtual network, only the promise of mobility and accessibility seems to offer an adequate metaphor. And that does not require much in the way of architecture as a physical reality.

The new reality that will be our lot "in the near future" is beyond any metaphorical description of "reality," and that spells the loss of architecture's age-old mandate. But won't there perhaps be enough reality left over to justify architecture? Won't even the android want to retain something of the biological and phenomenological quality of architecture? In other words, won't our bodies, however prostheticized, still retain sufficient evolutionary disadvantages to make architecture necessary in the future, too? At this particular moment in time no answers can be definitive. What can be asserted is that our relationship with the material world is getting weaker by the day. The ageold "adjacency imperative," that is, the necessity of nearness be-tween a human being and that person's social behaviour, is growing faint (cf. Mitchell). Now that everything is reduced to information in a data program even "matter" can attain the "speed of light" without becoming infinitely heavy. E=mc<sup>2</sup>? That's all behind us. In this version of the future what remains of the physical environment is a "trouble-free zone." All the stress and anxiety that went with the tyranny of distance in time and space is alleviated by an endless quantity of intelligent products. [Of course what always should be asked is whether this version of the future will be the actual one, and if so, whether we actually would like it.]

When we look more closely at the theoretical evaporation of architecture as an ordering of matter and penetrate further into cyberspace, it becomes clear that familiar antitheses such as public and private, interior and exterior, city and country, surface and depth, verticality and horizontality, have had their day. Electronic technology represents a radical assault on the biological order, gravitation, the notion of time, etc. Imagine that physical experience were indeed to be reduced to meals, visits to the lavatory, procreation, and moving the mouse; what price then the ancient art of architecture? And what purpose do the symbolic aspects of architecture serve when mutual under-standing and communication between people mostly take place via the net? Architecture is no longer a carrier of communication; communication no longer has any need of solid carriers. So the role of architecture as the carrier of memory is also on the way out. The situation is reversed, it is now the endlessly expand-able (computer) memory that is the carrier of architecture.

It would not surprise me that architecture, which for the past 100 years developed into a true specialization of space, will be marginalized by digitalization processes, since I

consider that physical space is no longer essential for the emancipation and manifestation of the individual.

In this way we have three breaking points in modern history which cannot of course be neatly indicated by dates: a) the 18th-century evolving awareness of the spatial results of imaginative models; b) the late 19th-century discovery of emptiness as actual matter, as basic element, as point of departure for building; c) the advent of space as pure fiction in cyberspace. What we are thus seeing is the conceptualization of a universal category that was earlier unconscious, moving toward the deliberate projection of imaginary space as the direct carrier of a universe in which a physical basis is no longer necessary.

In order to label this great historical transformation, I will introduce the model of the horizontalizing of world-view. With good reason, the 18th century can be seen as the starting point of this process. I am referring here to a development started at a large scale in that time in which vertical relationships with the Higher lose ground to a tendency in which people start seeing the other and themselves more and more in a profane context. The Higher from that moment on became less and less high. This is to be seen not so much in a number of institutional bodies where the Higher was considered to have its seat (these still exist today) as in the desacralization of the old holy authorities. God the Father, the absolute ruler as pater patriae, the guild master, the pater familias, and later the factory boss or the politician --they all lost their authority in a general tendency to relativize, set in motion by the rise of the autonomous individual and the subjectivism coupled with it. Even though these institutions were rejected for the sake of a freedom to install new, reasonable institutions (for example nature, the proletariat, the spirit of history), a series of new limitations took their place. Examining other cultures and historical periods in order to bring to light and overcome old irrational limitations, our own culture ultimately became one of many. 16 With the rejection of creation-ism, being was left at the mercy of the arbitrariness of evolutionary mutations. In becoming aware of social stratification, it only became clear how difficult it is to bring about social mobility, and that it can exist only on account of social differences themselves. With the need for a release from psychic tensions, insight has grown into the hermetic bastion of the mind filled with unconscious preoccupations of race (i.e. ethnicity), moment, and environment. In objectifying language, we saw to what extent language determines our thinking and self-image. Finally, with the enormous growth of technology, directed at conquering space, time, and physical imperfection, we have ended up in a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> One of the most influential works with regard to the enduring relativizing of god-given right is Voltaire's, Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations [Essay on the Mores and the Spirit of Nations], 1756-69. At least seven aspects of this relativizing can be distinguished in this work: A) The demonstration that change can characterize nature and culture more than permanence. B) The demonstration that culture "in its generality" is developing itself and thereby the discovery of tendencies. C) The demonstration of the irrationality and foolishness of all sorts of handed-down myths. D) The interest in primitive origins that should be regarded on their own merits. E) The belief in progress and along with that the skepticism with regard to the contemporary state of affairs. F) The demonstration of the universality of history and therefore of the necessity to adopt the histories of faraway peoples. G) Extending, as a consequence of F, the historical interest in "unpopular ages." The manner in which Voltaire takes sacrosanct absolutes under fire is biting. Where previously cultural resemblances were emphasized as eternal manifestations of the higher order, Voltaire preferred comparison and the determination of difference.

life dominated by the technology. In short, for each project to gain freedom yet another commensurate or higher price is paid. The exception here is that the new limitations can be proven "scientifically," whereas before you needed a proof of the existence of God. This is the horizontalization of the world-view: where once the gaze was directed upward at an existing, religious order, and the world around us was considered as an irrational no-man's-land suspected behind the horizon, now the gaze has been averted from the oversized and we look primarily around us and even more inwardly.<sup>17</sup> Not only space (expeditions of discovery) and time (history), but also the anthropological, biological, psychological, sociological, and semiotic contexts have sparked our interest. The field in which the individual is now situated is a finely knit web through whose meshes it becomes increasingly difficult to discern still virginal territory for the will. Nor is it surprising that the 18th century is considered the crucial period of struggle against the old sanctities and faith in the new. The space freed after cleaning up the old institutions had not yet been filled with the new, this time worldly, limitations. The discovery of Space as epistemological notion as well as of Self, and the coming into being of the historical investigation of attitudes toward both, are part of the dismantling of the vertical, hierarchical outlook on life.

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There exists an increasing tension between the current, still professed necessity to promote Self-Consciousness, and the developments in pedagogical or technological communications and semiotic areas where the final responsibility for behaviour is increasingly turned into an illusion, necessary or not. In a certain sense this book is a good example of this tension. For some, the Self seems barely to bob on the waves, and we are all suffering from some form of multiple personality syndrome. However, I am assuming here that a certain distance to the Self can still be reasonably maintained, which makes it possible to present a historical analysis of its transformations.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> I am borrowing "introspection" from a chapter in Weinstein and Platt's fascinating book about its history of introspection during the last two centuries. They call the literary developments on either side of 1900 (in which Dostoevsky, Schnitzler, Kafka, Proust, Joyce, among others, took part) the "introspective revolution." For the first time, writers were able, as a result of sociological changes in the objectrelation pattern, to gain access to a number of aspects of the personality that were earlier unconscious. With the help of a Freudian conceptual framework, they described the new need of children (i.e. "the sons") to achieve a personal autonomy for themselves. Through the modifications in the modern family pattern, for instance, the authority (of the father) was no longer seen as self-evident, and the censor's power to exorcise the striving toward autonomy lapsed. They compared these developments with the ideas of a philosopher of the Enlightenment such as Rousseau, who had taken the first steps on the path toward autonomy but who was far from accepting so much as his followers of roughly 150 years later. At that time, "the wish to be free" was still unable to leave behind the parameters of the political and social (cf. Weinstein and Platt 137-67.) For me, the general point is the interest that broke through in the 18th century in the individual's private feelings. Weinstein and Platt make plausible that new frontiers were constantly being breached in the quest that followed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> What one can make out from studies on the development of human subjectivity in the first place is that the writers evidently had nothing better to do, which is to say, nothing better than to manifest their subjectivity directly. I mean: having time for the systematization of thoughts about Self, indicates from the outset a certain kind of parasitism (Kierkegaard). Meanwhile we have gone so far with the self-reflection of humanity, that we know that this activity has more to do with self conceit than with disinterested curiosity. We do have to confess that only through this self conceit could this insight have been arrived at at all. At the same time it is also this very narcissism that can cause a civilization finally to fall apart.

In order to concretize the connection between Space and Self, I shall use the remainder of this article to take a closer look at the historical developments in the concept of Self. What is really needed for this is a responsible position within the existing formulations of theory with regard to Self: the theory of personality, philosophical individualism, identity thinking, and so forth. Within the scope of this article this is not possible. What should happen here is a brief sketch of a history of Self in terms of spatial awareness.

Just as earlier I distinguished the awareness of space from the goal-oriented investigation and realization of space which came afterward, similarly the consciousness of Self can already be found much longer ago. I do not mean here the becoming aware of the individual in the world, the humanistic individual who had to relate personally with respect to God and Nature. For me what matters here is the first psychological reflections about the essence of the individual, about what is the deepest innermost in the individual. With the exception of some rare precursors, 19 the tendency to objectify the purely subjective begins to in-crease from the middle of the 18th century onward. As the universal, god-given rules (that had just been so enthusiastically drawn up by humanists) of natural science, music, plastic art, architecture, and all the way to politics were being doubted, and the relativity of the here and now was quietly postulated, the great adventure of the investigation of the Self began.<sup>20</sup> People started seeing themselves as occurrences. For the time being anyway, and for many that makes the 18th century so attractive, a unique occurrence. The feeling of being different produced many literary works that attempted to disclose that "otherness." The inner essence was no longer an uncontrolled pool of decay, 21 but a striven-for topic for romantics in the literal sense of the word.

Initially the attention paid to the Self was out to use itself as an example for the others. People wanted to generalize their own inner life. So, in my opinion, we may call Rousseau's Confessions and The Reveries of a Solitary Stroller not only strongly autobiographical but also didactic. But the idea that the reader can still learn

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We might think here of someone like Montaigne, who is seen as the late 16thcentury inventor of the autobiographical essay: "This book was written in good faith, reader. It warns you from the outset that in it I have set myself no goal but a domestic and private one." (2)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> A good source for this development is the personal or ego document, especially autobiographical literature (cf. once again Weinstein and Platt). Generally, on the large-scale historical changes brought on by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, cf. also the important insights by Hartmann, who asserted that under certain complicated circumstances in culture, the ego will want to maintain its organizing capabilities by means of deeper insights into unconscious processes (71).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> In the early modern age, the first centuries of the civilizing offensive, there was also a great fear of the uncontrollable inner world. Work was done on a large scale to regulate and control aberrant behavior, with not infrequent casualties: e.g., the burning of witches at the stake. I would like to formulate the thesis that attention for inner life could come about when the worst of the chaos had been tamed. Likewise, when the evil outside world was definitively pacified, from the end of the 17th century, a great interest among the citizenry in Western Europe could come about for houses in the country. Weinstein and Platt write in terms of "being able to accept psychic preoccupations," but relate this more to the individual psychic consequences of watering down traditional identities than to the effects of the civilizing offensive.

something from the writer began to recede: at the end of the 18th century, an introspective tradition was established that has lasted until today. The most intimate private circumstances and feelings were now brought into the limelight and exploited. In short and in a capsule, we can sum up this development with the What do I know? of Montaigne, via the Who am I? of Stendhal and Nietzsche's Ecce Homo up to Barthes's "Death of the Author." In terms of Self, one could say that from its discovery as inner life, as "interiority," doubt about this gradually increased until this doubt was finally celebrated as the greatest good, even leaving the Self behind to start up a new horizontal relationship with the world: not in an animistic sense as in tribal cultures, but poststructuralistically, as an element in a communicative network, as a little cog in the language machine called society.<sup>22</sup>

[If then came cyberspace, one could say that we were ready for it.]

My name is oleb@xs4all.nl. My identity, address, and cyberhome are theoretically exchangeable. There is nothing inevitable about my [digital] persona; it does not depend on biology, birth, and social circumstances but on a readily manipulated, intangible product. [I'm compatible, you are compatible, and we both are updatable and upgradable]

Cyberspace already has immense cultural implications and will have even greater ones. But at the same time it lands us in a world where studying "cultural implications" has become a hobby of the same order as "arts and crafts." For the time being, however, I will venture the opinion that all the basic philosophical questions, insofar as they are still asked, will be answered differently.

The burning issues addressed by Montaigne, Kant, Stendhal, and Nietzsche are no longer "burning." No sooner have we taken on board the collapse of the moral illusion than we are ready for the ultimate epistemological one. Hello, Oprah, here I am! Now that it no longer matters, we can think anything we like. Just when Post-Modernism had created a moral vacuum, we can sign up for a crash course in information technology in preparation for logging on to cyberspace. Devoid of any ethical basis, this is a culture of incessant keeping up with the latest developments. Catching up, day in, day out. No matter who you listen to in this bit business, they talk about an inexorable wave that is rolling over us. And the funny thing is, this inexorable event is still presented as emancipation. The ascendancy of the blazing-fast processor will finally free us from ourselves. It is emancipation into a state where we can abolish our Selves. In the past we always demanded to see before believing. But now seeing = believing. The Enlightenment project has lost the element of time. You are either Enlightened or you are not. The ambition to bring more and more facts to light has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Notwithstanding putative come-backs of the individual, such as, for instance, recently proclaimed in the thematic issue of Magazine Litteraire, March 1989, "L'Individualisme: le grand retour," [Individualism: The Great Come-back].

ended up by giving us a new piety. [I won't get into scholastic considerations but to some extent we are the new mediavalists.]

In other words: just as space, when it became a conscious cate-gory, became at a given moment both point of departure and end, the Self also became a commendable point of departure and respectable end. In cultural politics, pedagogy, and the arts, in architecture and urban development, to argue for, to suggest, imagine or project a self-consciousness, to express its lack or problems with it, became the greatest good.

In sum, we find that when Space and Self entered consciousness, or rather were dug up out of the latent arsenal of the brain as conscious categories, it wasn't long before they disappeared as a dimension of things to become instead an element, a component of things, as a part of the program of life. Stated differently, as long as people still had to make the heavy trip every day to these fundamental dimensions of our mental equipment, everybody was still physically experiencing by themselves the struggle between the perception and the objectification of Space and Self, nobody thought these things to be free at her/his disposal. When, however, around 1900 psychology, physics, architecture, and also the arts had thrown themselves into the fray, the fight became a matter of ordinary duty and people were from childhood on taught that space and Self belonged to life. So these feisty demons became self-evident objects, the godly rules became, by means of categories a priori and Satze vom Grunde, dead-simple grid components of existence.

In the meantime ['we' (every now and then one should put this 'we' between parenthesis)] live more and more of our lives in cyberspace. For some, cyberspace represents the realization of a perfect world where the Creation can be repeated from scratch, but this time on our terms. They regard today's fairly schematic form of cyberspace as no more than a crude foretaste of the "21st century" or "the Third Millennium," when cyberspace will make full-blown teleliving possible. When we live in the electronic co-coon, we will log in to an online world that will provide us with everything we now have to go out and fetch for ourselves. The two most important elements of cyberspace, interaction and immersion, will then have become absolute. Everything will be compatible. The eye, which now enjoys primacy in every environment, will be supported by the other senses, including the sixth.

This is the current fascination. The identification of the content and the medium in one and the same code is an aspect of the media discussion that has for some 30 years now directly demanded the attention of social philosophers. It has become increasingly clear, through the advent of television and somewhat later of the electronic networks, that media technology has a direct influence on the message itself and must be considered to be not so much a continuous improvement of the "channels" or the "bandwidth" but a change in the nature of communication itself. It is

not what is communicated to us by means of the new sensual expansion of the electronic media that has profound personal and social consequences, but the form of the expansion itself. The message is a product, called information, that is wholly deter-mined by the codes inherent to the medium. The media introduce social relationships in their form and functioning rather than as carriers of content. And those relationships are not of an instrumental but rather of a neutralizing nature: they strip themselves of the exchange (of the communication) itself.

This thought has been taken even further by Jean Baudrillard, who in the end elevated code to be the ultimate power. Only code still communicates, the so-called communication has become a purely simulated game through the sheer quantity and speed of messages. Only information as product still circulates, with a semantic content that is assumed to be indecipherable and there-fore must make do without any double meanings. What remains is the "fascination" of the person who stares mesmerized down the barrels of the information cannons, without any hope of reply or at the very least, processing (Baudrillard explains "fascination" very well in Mele 75). Where Karl Kraus thought, "before, the decors were made of cardboard and the actors were real. But nowadays the decors are undoubtedly real and the actors made of cardboard" (3: 326), now the actors have all become audience. An audience that knows everything, that from its bird's-eye perspective now oversees everything in the here and now. And that's it.

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I described earlier how horizontalization can be understood as relativizing the vertical hierarchy of the Judeo-Christian tradition which became even stronger after the late Middle Ages through the separation of the sacred and the profane, of language and reality, of spirit and matter, etc. From the 18th century onward there were changes, but not yet to the extent that the structure wholly collapsed. On the contrary, the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the symbolic winners of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, postulated the autonomous subject that ruled the road from the empirical to the theoretical. But over the course of the 19th century, that autonomous subject became less and less sovereign; literati and scientists described the inner conflicts that, with the growing significance of middle-class values, had been promoted by middle-class sciences as the "contemporary problems of humanity." The individual, thought able to control himself like "the father his son, the educator his students, the lord his servants, and the ruler his subjects,"23 had to be put on a shorter and shorter leash. Finally people defined inner life itself as fundamentally unstable, and civilization was formulated in psychopathological terms (e.g. by Freud's Civilization and its Discontents). After God lost power over people and they started determining their own Self and limits, individuals lost power over themselves. First the Higher was taken down (and the diabolical unmasked) by a self-conscious subject,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Citation from Pere Maldonnat, 1621, in Snybert 264, and cf. Mitzman.

consequently the oh-so-astute ego was knocked off balance by its upstairs and downstairs neighbours (cf. Freud's housing the ego in a well-nigh architectonic stratification, together with its upstairs and downstairs neighbours, "Dis-section" 88-112). The rest is therapy. Getting ready for cyber-space.

In the digital paradigm, compression of real space and real time, an essential component of the modernization process, has been as it were superseded. The new media not only mean a translation of the old world into a new one, they also themselves generate a new world. Which is not like the old one. The crux of this newness is that informatization, binarization, is in principle disintegrating. Synthesis [, a very strong category of subjectivity,] is on a tense footing with the conversion of meaning to zeroes and ones. The value of dialectic, or hierarchical thought, falls away in the long run. Normativity also falls away. Instead there is lateral network-thinking. There is information which is in essence exchangeable, compatible, norm-free information. The process of modernization, once at this stage, consumes its own conceptual foundations: Space and the Self. [It no longer needs them and they are turned down.]

Not only space as concept but also the awareness of space, and thus the actions in and experience of space, have been affected by horizontalization. The signs on the walls, the reliefs, the tympanums, the colonnades, the rocailles, the festoons, the cartouches, the balusters and pediments, the stuccoes and wood carvings, all those means of expressing old authorities lost their self-evidence along with those authorities. More and more often people realized that, within a growing semiotic preoccupation, the means of expression were merely means of expression, and moreover expressed something for which people had lost interest and respect. The space that had been dominated so significantly by these ornaments became in the best case a tepid bath for aesthetics but not the adequate embodiment of a modern, let alone postmodern condition. Space found itself in this ambiguous position between 1750 and 1900. When ornament consequently started on the road back, when, to speak in the jargon of the apologetes of the Modern movement, "space was freed," it again became an expression of the prevailing sense of identity, e.g. of the identity crisis which, finally, became identity itself. So we see that horizontalization, in which metaphysical identifications were dismantled one by one and only text, context, and intertext remained, runs parallel to and is a direct influence on the dawning awareness and final realization of space as an end in itself. Space ended up being the theatre of the crisis; where ornament, where matter at first still provided a support for life, becoming a distraction in the Battle of Styles in the 19th century, in the 20th century -- the century in which the human was converted into a social, biological, psychological, historical, and semantic conglomerate --space became the stage for still trying to make something of it. It became the occasion. But occasion for what, that was the big question. With the introduction of cyberspace and the merging of meaning and information, that problem has now been solved. The question regarding the content of communication has been superseded. The point in cyberspace is not what, but that you communicate. Self-respect will henceforth be provided by the carriers through which that self-respect was originally expressed (for an extensive study of this subject cf. Bouman).

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At the end, I want to sum up once more my study of the connection between Space and Self on the basis of three variables.

A) The most striking connection is chronological parallelism. From the 18th century on we see a correlation between the development of the concept of Self and that of spatial awareness. Both were being explored on an increasingly larger scale: in architecture, people began to anatomize the parallax-effect to such an extent that it could become a strategy for building. As investigations of the Self flourished, we see a first direct focus on the ego. Yet in architectural theory or the theory of the personality, it wasn't until ca. 1900 that Space and Self as such were fully conceptualized, that they became a problem requiring a focused discussion. From that moment on we see the triumph of these terms in architectonic and psychological discourse. From being facts of which people had become aware, they became points of departure for behaviour and even strictly formulated ends.

This parallelism, I would assume, can be drawn out into the future. Both the belief in a positive concept of Space as the basis of architecture and the belief in the Self as essence of the person have distinctly succumbed to doubt. If we extrapolate from the earliest developments in cybernetic space, we can sketch a picture in which on the one hand a fragmented subject, a dividual, whether or not she or he is in treatment for Multiple Personality Syndrome, leads a life along the surfscapes of the new media, and where on the other space has been completely freed of a material carrier, and so of a locus, a place, identifiable by name. At this point negative freedom, that powerful ideal, has become total, and positive freedom has seemingly become zero. If the medium is the message, each trajectory of meaning has become arbitrary.

B) No less relevant is the mutual metaphorical relationship between Space and Self. Due to the striking historical congruence, to the still echoing opinions of spatial designers regarding identity, to the treatment of emptiness and matter, to the application of transparence and substance --an extremely strong metaphor for attitude and Self has been staged by Space. I would even assert that architectonic spatial history can serve excellently as a cross-section, a profile of cultural history. Just as the first allusions to spatial sensations, to aesthetic sensations at all, strongly refer to the superseding by the Moderns of the Ancients' classical ideal of beauty and to the advent of the subjectivism consonant with it; just as the criminalization of the old

ornament as carrier of dusty identities in favour of a freeing of space strongly refers to the new nominalism at the beginning of this century whereby truth was going to be made by the one seeking it; likewise cyberspace is the theatre of a post-Cartesian subject; a subject that no longer executes according to an inner "authentic" plan, but is rather a sum of artificial at-tempts and feelings, a permanent reflection on inner and outer impulses (cf. the views of Deleuze and Guattari).

C) Is there, besides these two rhetorical connections, also a causal connection between Space and Self? This is always a nettling question for a historian, and modesty is called for. Still, I would dare to assert that the development of the concept of Self has influenced the awareness of Space. When subjectivism and relativism appear in the 18th century, Space is gradually relieved of its religious and mythical substance. Over the course of the 19th century, a new worldly universe that can only be imbued with sense by people themselves becomes fashionable. The discovery of Space is the discovery of the platform for self-realization. Gradually, however, both Self as well as self-realization came to be seen as impossibilities. No matter how pedagogical, artistic or political programs aimed for unity and Self, the net result was only a further crumbling. At that moment secularized and neutralized modern space became a heavy burden. Postwar spatial designers all tried to overcome in one way or another this weakness in Modern Architecture. However this may be, Space was and is directly influenced by the degree of homogeneity exhibited by Self. And here I mean both the architect's Self, which has repercussions in her or his spatial solutions, as well as the abstract philosophical concept of Self. It is not surprising that with the wide acceptance of a post-Cartesian notion of the human being, architecture lost an important mandate. It no longer has to offer a stage for our behaviour, because that behaviour has been freed from the order of matter. It occurs increasingly in the electronic networks, in VR, in Smart Environments, on the Internet.

I also want to reverse the reasoning, although it is harder to technical evidence for this. Could it be that the development of the concept of Space influenced the history of Self? Could it be that the lengthy exposure to Baroque spatial caprices contributed to the rise of the 18th-century aesthetics of spatial sensations; that the lengthy exposure to the unfounded and uprooted architecture of facades in the 19th-century neostyles contributed to the rise of 20th-century nominalism; that the lengthy exposure to the transparent modern architecture of "boxes and chests" contributed to the role confusion that dismantled all the old hierarchies and metaphysics? Could it possibly be that a lengthy sojourn in cyberspace, in networks, compartments, and intelligent buildings, will in time entirely supplant the idea of space as a space for the play and action of a deliberating and decision-making individual? If this is the case, we could agree with Heinrich Zille's assertion: "You can kill a person with a building just as easily as with an axe" (in Banham 319). Except that this is long-term murder and The Person here is seen as the invention of humanism. The truth surrounding this causal influence will, however, not be disclosed before the theory of space has become a mature component of cultural history.

In conclusion: The end of the individual, the ego, the Self, means the end of just about everything that Western culture has taken to heart. We are becoming new beings, zombies or enlightened minds. In any case, a rich tradition, a historical mission, will end with this cycle of Self. This study, in its attempt to write a rise and fall of the "Self," necessarily had to retain certain essential concepts. It should be noted here that with the absolute "fall," the distance necessary for an analysis of the historical congruence between Space and Self will also obviously no longer exist. As far as that goes, this investigation, should it be successful, can be regarded as "the final investigation." You could also say that this sentence is the last one I could write out of a need for self-reflection.

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